Recent Developments: Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc. by Lucas, Hayley C.
University of Baltimore Law Forum 
Volume 48 Number 1 Article 11 
10-1-2017 
Recent Developments: Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc. 
Hayley C. Lucas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucas, Hayley C. (2017) "Recent Developments: Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc.," University of Baltimore 
Law Forum: Vol. 48 : No. 1 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol48/iss1/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
ROGERS V. HOME EQUITY USA, INC.: A LEAD PAINT
EXPOSURE CLAIM CAN SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY ESTABLISHING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
A REASONABLY PROBABLE SOURCE OF THE LEAD
POISONING.
By: Hayley C. Lucas
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a plaintiff can survive
summary judgment if the circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the
subject property was a reasonably probable source of his lead poisoning.
Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc., 453 Md. 251, 277, 160 A.3d 1207, 1223
(2017). The court further ruled that a plaintiffs use of purely circumstantial
evidence does not require him to rule out other potential sources of lead
exposure. Id. at 268, 160 A.3d at 1217. Therefore, the trial court erred when
it granted summary judgment on the issues of source and source causation.
Id. at 277, 160 A.3d at 1223.
In October 1996, Terrance Rogers ("Rogers") and his mother moved into
a row home owned by Home Equity USA, Inc. ("Home Equity"). They lived
at the Home Equity property for approximately six months. Between June of
1995 and August of 1997 Rogers' blood lead levels were tested six times.
The test results revealed that Rogers' blood lead levels were elevated and
remained elevated during his tenancy at the Home Equity property. In
addition, the tests revealed that Rogers' blood lead levels declined after he
vacated the Home Equity property.
In May 2013, Rogers filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City against Home Equity for negligence. Rogers alleged that he was
poisoned by lead-based paint as a toddler while living at the Home Equity
property and suffered permanent brain damage as a result. Rogers
introduced evidence that the interior of the Home Equity property had tested
positive for lead-based paint in 1976. There was also no evidence indicating
that a full lead abatement had ever been performed on the property. In
addition, Rogers presented reports from Dr. Simon and Dr. McDaniel, who
both concluded that the Home Equity property was a substantial contributing
source to Rogers' lead poisoning. Dr. McDaniel testified that it took thirty to
forty-five days for blood tests to accurately reflect the level of lead exposure.
Therefore, Rogers' increased lead levels while living at the Home Equity
property indicated that the property was a significant source of his exposure.
In December 2014, Home Equity moved for summary judgment. Home
Equity argued that Rogers had failed to rule out all other possible sources of
lead exposure. Therefore, Rogers could not survive summary judgment on
the issues of source and source causation of his lead poisoning. The trial
court granted summary judgment and Rogers filed a timely appeal. The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the issue
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of source causation alone. Rogers filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment de novo, and in the light most favorable to Rogers.
Rogers, 453 Md. at 262, 160 A.3d at 1214. Rogers argued that he had
presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment on both source and
source causation, thus he was not required to rule out other possible sources
of lead exposure. Id. at 263, 160 A.3d at 1214. The court noted that to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff is only required to show a
reasonable probability that the property was a source of the lead exposure
and poisoning. Id. at 264-65, 160 A.3d at 1215. As a result, the plaintiff was
not required to conclusively establish the issues of source and source
causation. Id. at 265, 160 A.3d at 1215.
Next, the court addressed whether Rogers had presented sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment by analyzing the two theories of
causation for lead paint cases. Rogers, 453 Md. at 265-66, 160 A.3d at 1215-
16. The court proceeded under the theory of causation used in Hamilton v.
Kirson which allows a plaintiff to "rule in" the subject property as a
reasonably probable source through substantial circumstantial evidence. Id.
at 266, 160 A.3d at 1216 (citing Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501, 527-28,
96 A.3d 714 (2014)). Under a Kirson theory of causation, to survive
summary judgment Rogers was not required to rule out all other possible
sources of lead exposure. Rogers, 453 Md. at 266, 160 A.3d at 1216. Instead,
he had to present sufficient evidence related to the subject property. Id. The
court noted the quality and quantity of circumstantial evidence provided by
Rogers was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer that the Home Equity
property contained lead-based paint during the time Rogers resided there.
Rogers, 453 Md. at 270-72, 160 A.3d at 1218-20 (citing Kirson, 439 Md. at
544, 96 A.3d 714; Hamilton v. Dackman, 213 Md. App. 589, 75 A.3d
327(2013)).
The court next considered Dr. McDaniel's testimony. Rogers, 453 Md. at
271, 160 A.3d at 1219. Dr. McDaniel testified that Rogers' blood lead levels
would have decreased about thirty days after the exposure had ended.
However, they remained elevated until Rogers vacated the Home Equity
property. Id. From Dr. McDaniel's testimony, a jury could reasonably infer
that the Home Equity property was a reasonably probable source of his lead
exposure. Id. at 272, 160 A.3d at 1219-20. Therefore, the court held that
summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue. Id. at 273, 160
A.3d at 1220.
Next, the court addressed source causation. Specifically, the court
focused on whether Rogers presented sufficient evidence to support an
inference that it was reasonably probable that the lead exposure at the Home
Equity property contributed to his injury. Rogers, 453 Md. at 273, 160 A.3d
at 1220. Under Kirson, Rogers was only required to show that the Home
Equity property was a substantial contributing factor to his injury. Id. The
court determined that a jury could reasonably conclude from the blood tests
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that because Rogers' blood lead levels had not declined while living at the
Home Equity property, the property had contributed to his lead poisoning.
Id. at 276-77, 160 A.3d at 1222-23. Thus, the court held that summary
judgment was improperly granted on the issue of source causation. Id.
Concluding that Rogers had provided enough evidence to establish both
source and source causation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
summary judgment was improperly granted. Id. at 277, 160 A.3d at 1223.
The dissenting opinion argued that the majority extensively reduced the
burden of proof a plaintiff must meet to avoid summary judgment in a lead
paint negligence claim. Rogers, 453 Md. at 284, 160 A.3d at 1227. The
dissent further asserted that the majority's "rule in" theory provided no clear
basis in law or public policy and, therefore, may be difficult for the trial
courts to apply. Id. at 287, 160 A.3d at 1228.
In Rogers, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held for the first time that a
lead paint plaintiff may survive summary judgment through substantial
circumstantial evidence without ruling out other possible sources of lead
exposure. This decision protects future plaintiffs who may lack the
necessary resources to eliminate other potential sources of exposure.
Plaintiffs facing the difficulties of proof will now have an alternative method
to establish a subject property as a reasonably probable source of lead
exposure. In addition, this theory of causation is favorable to plaintiffs who
wait to bring their claims until several years after their lead exposure. This is
due to the fact that eliminating other potential sources becomes increasingly
difficult with the passing of time. Accordingly, this decision sets a guiding
principle as to the amount of circumstantial evidence a plaintiff must provide
under a "rule in" theory of causation to survive summary judgment. In doing
so, Rogers resolves the question of how much circumstantial evidence is
sufficient and will prevent inconsistencies in the future.
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